Commentary on Henrik Walter's “The third wave of biological psychiatry” by Markus R. Pawelzik
OPINION ARTICLE
published: 20 November 2013
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00832
Commentary on Henrik Walter’s “The third wave of
biological psychiatry”
Markus R. Pawelzik*
EOS-Klinik für Psychotherapie, Muenster, Germany
*Correspondence: pawelzik@eos-klinik.de
Edited by:
Marco Stier, University of Muenster, Germany
Keywords: biologism in psychiatry, zombie-psychology, medical model of mental disorder, psychological individualism, behavioral self-programing of
the brain
There is good news: “Biological psychia-
try is no longer biologistic!” According to
Walter (2013), a seasoned German neu-
roscientist, psychiatrist and philosopher,
a putative “third wave” of biological psy-
chiatry has overcome many flaws that
for a long time motivated our opposi-
tion to biological psychiatry: The third
wave is no longer reductionist, localiza-
tions, or ignorant toward the normative,
social, and cultural dimensions of men-
tal problems. Rather, it analyses dynamic
neural network activities, distinguishes
multiple levels of description and takes
every kind of context dependence you
name into account. Furthermore, the third
wave is aware of its methodological, the-
oretical and therapeutic limitations; and
it self-criticizes all kinds of program-
matic overstatements common in the field.
In a nutshell: The third wave liberated
biological psychiatry from its biologistic
roots. It restricts itself to the legitimate
search for the “biosignatures” of mental
disorders.
From a down-to-earth point of view,
this is hard to believe. Participate in any
conference of biological psychiatrists these
days and you can see that big money, phar-
maceutical industry, reductionist ideas of
man and a biologically biased psychiatric
practice form a veritable, obviously flour-
ishing coalition. But blaming theory for
failed praxis would be unfair to Walter’s
informed and interesting paper. The ques-
tion put forward by my commentary is,
therefore, a theoretical one: Are there any
crucial remnants of biologism in Walter’s
apology of third wave biological psychia-
try? I think there are at least two points
that justify further critical examination—
points thatWalter belabors extensively: the
role of the mind and the role of the medi-
cal model of mental disorders in biological
psychiatry.
What about the mind? Mentally ill peo-
ple suffer. They consciously experience
the burden of their condition. Psychiatry
always intended to deal with the “mind-
edness” of mentally disordered people.
But can modern neurosciences—the foun-
dational basis of biological psychiatry—
explain the phenomenon of mental life?
The issue is not that mindedness depends
on brain activity; it does. The controver-
sial subject is that our scientific approaches
to the study of the mental realm are mis-
guided. Let me hint at three exemplary
ways of misguidance:
(i) Due to the methodological restric-
tions of the behavioral sciences,
biological psychiatry studies “zom-
bies”—people with the same
neuro-behavioral properties but
without subjective consciousness.
Zombie-psychology looks for strict
correlations between operationalized
behavioral paradigms and objec-
tively measured neuronal activities;
proceeding in this way excludes the
mental realm by definition. As long as
this is the case, all that biological psy-
chiatry can ask for is the special status
of an “applied clinical neuroscience”
assisting general psychiatry.
(ii) Even worse is the individualism of
biological psychiatry: The disturbed
mental functions of psychiatric
patients are regarded as individ-
ual, natural dispositions of the
brain. Being a naturalist myself, I
strongly disagree with this premise:
Mental functions—our abilities to
feel, to think, to act—are collec-
tively defined, socio-cultural artifacts
rather than purely natural, indi-
vidual dispositions. To acculturate
an individual, the “natural bottom
up processes” of our species-design
are developmentally coupled with
socially mediated “non-natural top
down processes” (Prinz, 2012).
Conventional “mental instruments”
are a result of the adaption to the cog-
nitive niches of our culture (Sterelny,
2003); and they have to be continu-
ously interpersonally re-calibrated to
be effective (Pawelzik, 2013a). Walter
acknowledges this point when he
argues for a multi-level approach:
The influence of interpersonally
mediated cultural influences takes
place on supra-individual levels of
analysis: Activities on all levels—
from gene expression to the cultural
scaffolding of behavior—are rel-
evant to understand a mind. But
biological psychiatry does not study
singular developments; it aims at the
regularities of mental disorders; it
therefore has to specify which con-
ditions on what levels generate the
syndromatic pattern that defines a
kind of disorder. Looking into the
brain for “biosignatures” will not
inform you about the impact of
the supra-individual level processes.
In personal communication Walter
would rebut: “All inputs, despite the
level of origin, converge on processes
in the brain; the brain is the eye of
the needle of pathogentic influences.”
But what about the interpretation
of the data you gather from the
needle’s eye? Will you be able to
understand them if you disregard
the nested senso-motoric slopes that
“embody,” “embed,” and “extend”
the “enactive” mind in a body, in a
situation and a culture? Since Walter
doesn’t give us the slightest idea how
this might succeed, I take his third
wave as an individualistically limited
enterprise.
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(iii) What about the mind’s active role
in the etiology of pathological
behavior? Walter mentions Levy’s
(2013) argument that addiction is
no brain disorder like Alzheimer’s
since addicts can stop their addicted
behavior. He counters this argument
with the example of phenylke-
tonuria: this metabolic disorder
does not stop when you put your
child on a phenylketon-free diet,
since the pathogenetic mechanism
is still left unchanged. Following
this line of argument, one could
say: all my thoughts, decisions and
intentional actions—my way of
life—will not change my brain,
since the pathogenetic biological
predispositions—from risk genes
to temperament and maladaptive
schemata—are still left unchanged.
But this is simply not true. My
actions can successively change my
brain and its pathogenetic potentials.
My strategies of effortful control of
attention, e.g., that were entrained
in early attachment-interactions
and are actively developed to deal
with all kinds of practical and social
challenges in later life have an enor-
mous influence on my behavior
(Posner, 2012)—and therefore on
my risk to develop a mental disor-
der (Pawelzik, 2013b). If the mind
that supervenes on brain states can
actively change brain states, thereby
redirecting the brain’s development
depending on various environmental
contingencies—than this “enactive
mind” is obviously underspecified by
the third wave concepts Walter offers.
In order to overcome its traditional
“mindlessness,” biological psychia-
try will have to undergo nothing less
than a conceptual revolution.
Psychiatry is mainly about mental disor-
ders, not about mindedness. “You are asking
for too much,” a sympathetic biological
psychiatrist might respond. Scientific psy-
chiatry would overstretch its chances if it
tried to focus on the mindedness of the
mentally ill. Scientific psychiatry’s role is
first and foremost to define and analyze
mental disorders and to develop effective
therapies. No wonder that Walter spilled
most of his ink on the regulative idea of
the field—the idea that mental disorders as
nomological kinds.
“According to the third wave of biolog-
ical psychiatry, mental disorders are rel-
atively stable prototypical, dysfunctional
patterns of experience and behavior,”
Walter declares. But is this really the case
outside of university departments (where
patients are strictly selected to fit scien-
tific study designs)? Most of my patients
show syndrome shifts, present symptoms
that fit multiple diagnoses (on all axis of
the DSM-taxonomy) and suffer from a
wide range of nosologicaly ignored prob-
lems. These facts obviously limit the “pro-
totypicality” of their illness. Furthermore,
the contingencies of their learning histo-
ries, the influence of transdiagnostic, i.e.,
disease-unspecific developmental trajecto-
ries like attachment organization, their
social situation and their individual “iden-
tity politics” call for an individualizing
behavioral analysis that stretches over the
whole spectrum of descriptive levels in
order to plan effective therapy. No won-
der that third wave biological psychiatry
did not show up with the most con-
vincing proof for the role of nomologi-
cal pathogenesis—a therapy that fixes the
pathogenetic mechanism.
Nevertheless, Walter might answer,
that the phenotypical heterogeneity of
mental illness might still depend on
relatively homogenous biological regu-
larities. Let’s take genetic risk factors,
e.g., Colleagues of Walter just demon-
strated that the same genetic risk loci
of two calcium channel signaling genes
are involved in the development of five
major mental disorders—autism, atten-
tion deficit-hyperactivity disorder, bipolar
disorder, major depressive disorder and
schizophrenia—that make up an astonish-
ing broad spectrum of psychopathologies
(Cross-Disorder Group of the Psychiatric
Genomics Consortium, 2013). The
pleiotropic effects of CACNA1C and
CACNB2, this study highlights, might
be due to the susceptibility for specific
phenotypes depending on differential
environmental influences. Well, we know
that mental disorders are of multi-genetic
origin and that gene-x-environment-
interactions play an important role.
But this truism doesn’t specify the
un-numberable interactive possibilities
of epigenetics. To defend the idea of
a quasi-nomologic etiology of mental
disorder, one should at least be able to
determine the interaction of a number of
“risk-genes” that generate disease-specific
“endophenotypes.” In the case of Major
Depressive Disorder, for instance, experts
are discussing a rather long list of poten-
tial candidates ranging from anomalies
of the HPA-axis to decreased subgen-
ual PFC-activity (Hasler et al., 2004).
What if vague syndromes like depression
consist of individual mixtures of “sub-
endophenotypes?” That might be the case;
therefore we have to find out on which
level we find the “mechanistic property
clusters” that distinguish between sup-
posed types of mental disorders, Walter
might answer. If the nomological structure
is not found on the levels of epigenetics or
proteomics, it might still be found on the
levels of the connectome and/or the activa-
tion patterns of definable neural networks.
All we need is a biotype that robustly
correlates with certain experiential and
behavioral patterns. Without going into
further details, my question is: What will
happen if no connective or functional pat-
terns fit our established nosology? Will we
go for a better, strictly biological nosol-
ogy, as Thomas Insel demands? Or will
the regulative idea of psychiatry—mental
disorders are nomological kinds—slowly
degenerate? I don’t know. But as a keen
observer of the dynamic market of “biosig-
natures” I wouldn’t put much money on
this meta-hypothesis that Walter’s third
wave still entertains.
To sum up:Walter’s description of third
wave biological psychiatry is on the right
track: We should embrace his purgation
of a lot of biologistic thought. Still, as I
tried to show, Walter left the main con-
ceptual pillars of biological psychiatry—
“mindlessness” and “medical model”—
basically untouched.
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